News Of The Day...

This is not the news of the day. Though it is about a pilot. A WWII pilot named Charlie Brown. Is it a true story?

Snopes.com seems to think so. Here is the link................

http://www.snopes.com/military/charliebrown.asp

Not trying to interrupt the Air France story. I just wanted to post this story because we are talking about flight.

More from the Air France disaster. This article talks of the flight breaking up over minutes. This theory seems plausible. The story also brings up the senosors. Could of there been problems with the sensors? Well I wonder about a somethings related to this.

1.) How old was this aircraft, and how long has this style of aircraft been flying.?

2.) If this design of aircraft has been around for a while. One would think problems with the sensors would have been noticed a while ago.

3.) Could it be pilot error, or could it be that they just did not see the storm (The CE) in time to be able to maneuver in time. The storm could of batted this plane around like it was a rag doll. Mother Nature is an unforgiving bitch.

4.) I hate to bring this up, though it needs to be brought up. The theory about the sensors being a possible cause to what brought the plane down. Could it be this is being used to shift blame from the airline, and to the manufacturer of the aircraft. You know for insurance reasons.
This is why I feel it is important to know the age of the aircraft, and how long this design has been in service.

Link follows...................

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/5504739/Air-France-plane-broke-up-over-number-of-minutes.html

Very good points Theophilus. I wonder if it might not just be a case of one thing after another going wrong. Not just one thing that they could of probably handled, but a couple if not a series of circumstances all coming together at the same time. This is one of those we're likely not to know in out life time though. Unless luck happens to show them the way to the black box.

CarolinaHound wrote:Very good points Theophilus. I wonder if it might not just be a case of one thing after another going wrong. Not just one thing that they could of probably handled, but a couple if not a series of circumstances all coming together at the same time. This is one of those we're likely not to know in out life time though. Unless luck happens to show them the way to the black box.

I feel the black boxes may be found. I know all to well how sound travels through water, as I was in submarines when I was in the Navy. I would be very surprised if they were not found by the deep water craft they have looking for them now. It could be they are wedged in somewhere, in a position to not give off a proper signal. Again it could be they were damaged to a point where a signal could not be possible.

I think put it out there baby would be able to say more as far as what the black boxes can do, and how much damage they can take. I mean I don't know if the signal it produces is multi-dimensional. How about if one is buried underneath rocks, and aircraft debris.

Did you happen to see the crew jump seats in the photos put in out there baby posted?

I think this is very telling in one aspect as to what happened.

Meaning that what ever happened, happened very quickly. That there was no time to get to those jump seats. So I think a breech of the aircraft happened. That everyone was dying at that point. The plane kept flying while being beat about by the storm, and slowly broke apart and crashed to the ocean in pieces.

Theophilus wrote:

CarolinaHound wrote:Very good points Theophilus. I wonder if it might not just be a case of one thing after another going wrong. Not just one thing that they could of probably handled, but a couple if not a series of circumstances all coming together at the same time. This is one of those we're likely not to know in out life time though. Unless luck happens to show them the way to the black box.

I feel the black boxes may be found. I know all to well how sound travels through water, as I was in submarines when I was in the Navy. I would be very surprised if they were not found by the deep water craft they have looking for them now. It could be they are wedged in somewhere, in a position to not give off a proper signal. Again it could be they were damaged to a point where a signal could not be possible.

I think put it out there baby would be able to say more as far as what the black boxes can do, and how much damage they can take. I mean I don't know if the signal it produces is multi-dimensional. How about if one is buried underneath rocks, and aircraft debris.

Did you happen to see the crew jump seats in the photos put in out there baby posted?

I think this is very telling in one aspect as to what happened.

Meaning that what ever happened, happened very quickly. That there was no time to get to those jump seats. So I think a breech of the aircraft happened. That everyone was dying at that point. The plane kept flying while being beat about by the storm, and slowly broke apart and crashed to the ocean in pieces.

Yea I saw that pic. Maybe they never knew what happened and it was over quick. I know that sounds bad, but if it had to happen, I'd hope it was quick.

Hi Guys! I am here for few....This particulary plane had only been in service for just over 4 years. (not quite 4 1/2) This plane was the model A-330-200.

Airbus was started as a consortium of 4 areospace giants,
as Airbus France, Airbus Deutschland, Airbus UK and Airbus España. This all began in the early 70's and they are currently based out of Toulouse, France. They have a very long history. It has changed it's consortium around a few times with mergers etc., I don't know the complete history of that, never kept up on it all. But they have had, like most areospace companies several restructures, and changes as the company as grown.

The first model was Airbus A- 300/A-310, , A-318/A-319, then came A-320/A-321 and then A-330/A-340 and A-380 and finally the new A-350 which I believe will be active in 2011. There are varients of each model, depending on the size, type and size of engines, dimensions, weight, configuration of the plane etc. There is even an A-600 which is used as a transport plane as opposed to a commerical plane. The first bus I believe, flew in 1974.
Their biggest competitor is Boeing. It is the rival to the Boeing 737, but the bus is first airliner to introduce a fly-by-wire flight control, in which the pilot's directions are transmitted electronically rather than through systems of cords and pulleys. A subject of great debate among pilots believe me.

The A-330 hs had up til now an excellent safety record and no fatalities in any incidents up til now. It did have a crash turing a test flight in the mid 90's however. They have had issues also in flight like many model of aircraft and there have been some passenger injuries,but nothing like a major crash and no loss of life. That is what is so surprising in this incident. There have been, as I remeber something like 18 or 19 crashes since te inception of Airbus and this includeds all models. So that is a very good record actually.

I believe, that the first reports/incidents of the pito tubes started in May of last year. Airbus issued directives and reccommendations. The problem was that none of the incidents caused a crash and many of them were intermittent and temporary in nature. I have heard the number of incidents vary from 6 to 8 to 10, so I know there were only a handful, but still.... I am still of the opionon, because the bus is know for it's ability to fly at the highest of altitudes and with the greatest speeds and is used extensively in long distance oceanic flights from one continent to another, that they should have been grounded, more investigation should have been performed and they should have been replaced. But again, it is obviousy a matter of profit and money over saftey. I hate saying this, believe me.

As for the Flight Data Recorder and the Voice Data Recorder, they are housed in the most rear area of tail section of the fuselage because that section seems to in general suffer the least damage even in a crash and has a different bit of structure and material in it. The boxes are designed to ping for 30 days. They are connected electrically by generators to the plane while in flight. The "pinging" may last a bit longer than 30 days, but not by much. The boxes themselves are constructed out of titanium.

The black boxes (which by the way really bright orange for visability sakes) are able to survive an impact of 3,400 g's for up to 6.5 milliseconds. This rapid deceleration is equivalent to slowing from a speed of 310 miles per hour (500 km/h) to a complete stop in a distance of just 18 inches (45 cm). This requirement is tested by firing the CSMU from an air cannon to demonstrate the device can withstand an impact force at least 3,400 times its own weight. The black boxes must also survive a penetration test during which a steel pin dropped from a height of 10 ft (3 m) impacts the CSMU at its most vulnerable point with a force of 500 pounds (2,225 N). In addition, a static crush test is conducted to demonstrate that all sides of the CSMU can withstand a pressure of 5,000 pounds per square inch (350 kg/cm²) for five minutes. The fire resistance of the CSMU is further tested by exposing it to a temperature of 2,000°F (1,100°C) for up to an hour. The device is also required to survive after lying in smoldering wreckage for ten hours at a temperature of 500°F (260°C).

Other requirements specify survivability limits when immersed in liquids. The CSMU must endure the water pressure found at an ocean depth of 20,000 ft (6,100 m), and a deep-sea submersion test is conducted for 24 hours. Another saltwater submersion test lasting 30 days demonstrates both the survivability of the CSMU and the function of an Underwater Locator Beacon (ULB), or "pinger," that emits an ultrasonic signal once a second when immersed in water. These signals can be transmitted as deep 14,000 ft (4,270 m) and are detectable by sonar to help locate the recorders. A final series of tests includes submerging the CSMU in various fluids like jet fuel and fire extinguishing chemicals to verify the device can withstand the corrosive effects of such liquids.

The issue is the depth of this area of ocean where they are most likely located. No boxes have ever been located let alone retrieved at depths of even half of what these depths are. That is the big issue here. The pinger will emissions can easly be masked by canyons, water elements being buried under something, and other factors as well. The topography of this particular ocean floor is no where flat. It is all mountainous canyons and riffs sadly and great varying depths. So locating the boxes is one thing. Retrieving them is quite another. I am not sure they will be located at this point and retrieving them would be possibly impossible. Also, if the crash is severe enough, now this is rare, but it has occurred- the pingers can actually become dislodged from the boxes. They really have no true idea of even where to search. The "area" is just huge. (Like the size of the the state of Kansas- to put everything in perspective) We are already into 14 days into the crash so the margine is narrowing time wise to find the two boxes. They can also be so badly damaged, that the data /or parts of the data is not recoverable.

A note about the jumpseats, there are also jump seats located on one side of the cabin and another set towards the front of the cabin, attached to a bulkhead there, on the bus. This flight carried I believe a crew of 13 with 7 or 8 of them being Flight Attendants. So, this is somewhat telling as the seat belts are obviously stowed, as they always are when not in use. And who knows how many Attendants could have been in the crew rest station as well at the time of the accident....most likely some of them.

Here are some pics from the Brazillian Air Force site
of what was recovered today. It is the same item in all three pics and it is definately a spoiler panel from one of the wings.

Just my speculation, but it appears that if airborne prior to failure, the wing was traveling through the airstream backward. (Coontie this may harken back to your tail down theory- cripes that is bad news) If they were deployed, and the airplane broke up in fight, then the air would have been coming from behind during the tumble. That could indicate that in forward flight, q wasn't high enough to fail them aft. It almost appears as the spoiler had been fully deployed when it was torn away. When stowed, it's a fairly firmly rooted panel, and flush to the airflow across the wing. I'm trying to visualize the type of odd flow that would pull it out of the wing while stowed. Looking at the hinged corner failures, it would appear the spoiler failed forward, away from its mount, with the airflow from the trailing edge of the wing flowing forward. The surface skin is not broken, while the underside has a fracture that would suggest forward failure, and the rollers ripped from the rails/attach points. Deployed in normal fashion, airflow pushes energetically to stow the spoiler, the structure is not designed to prevent the spoiler from 'being pulled or forced' forward. It is only a suggestion, but may explain why the fracture is underneath and the attachments are fairly sound. Yikes.

photo deleted

cleaned up my photo albums on photo bucket and deleted pics this weekend. didn't realize they would disappear on here. sorry. ugh

Are those things made of metal or fiberglass? I wouldn't think the wreckage would float like that, and the way it's torn looks more like fibergalss. I thought planes were made of metal. Sorry if that's a stupid question, but like I said, save one short (thank God) hop in a single engine, the only planes I've been near were made of plastic, and I either glued or snaped them together.

I found it funny the pilot called it a hop. Was more like a hell ride down a potholed dirt road on a harley with bad springs. lol

CarolinaHound wrote:Are those things made of metal or fiberglass? I wouldn't think the wreckage would float like that, and the way it's torn looks more like fibergalss. I thought planes were made of metal. Sorry if that's a stupid question, but like I said, save one short (thank God) hop in a single engine, the only planes I've been near were made of plastic, and I either glued or snaped them together.

I found it funny the pilot called it a hop. Was more like a hell ride down a potholed dirt road on a harley with bad springs. lol

No the heavies use what they can to reduce weight. Though there is only so much you can do with this concern. (According to design) and I will even ask put it out there baby on this one. The planes are designed to carry the weight of the passengers.

I am starting to think pilot error on this. I think we are putting to much pressure on new people to fill the seats. I believe this was pilot error. The pilots of that aircraft did not do their job. They failed, and in the mean time 200+ people lost lives due to pilots not knowing what the hell they were doing.

ROTFL!! That is what I always call a flight in a damn puddle jumper. I have manageed to avoid all single engine planes my entire life.

Your question is not stupid by the way. All "modern" planes are constructed out of varyious types of composite materials and super metal aluminum alloys (these are special aluminun alloys developed for their strength, durability and light weight) with different layers of laminates (even aluminum laminate) and include not only lightweight metals, but also fiber composite plastics, particularly carbon-fiber reinforced plastics (CFRPs). The skins are aluminum for instance.

This being said, there are also structures inside and behind the surface (sandwhiched inbetween both sides of a "part or section" which are constructed for various reasons, (strength always being a factor, load stress factors etc.) Like the VS Vertical Stabilizer' interior construction for example, is a honey comb type of construction. Some components contain a rib type interior and so on.

There are three basic types of materials or elements in the structure of an airplane: stiffened shells, stiffened plates, and I-beams. Stiffening means that the plate or shell has oddly shaped pieces of metal welded to the back side to strengthen it. This allows the plate or shell to carry more weight. On an airplane, the fuselage (body) and nacelles (outer covering of the engine) are covered with stiffened shells. The wing itself can be considered an I-beam. Spars are welded to the I-beam, at right angles, to form the wing. The top and bottom surfaces of the wings are covered with stiffened plates.

Computing the loads on the different components (parts) of an airplane can be very difficult. Tension loads (pulling molecules apart) on simple parts can be fairly easy to compute. Compressive stresses (pushing molecules together) can be much more difficult to figure. Plates and shells tend to be thin. This means they can buckle or bend (deform) long before they reach the failure point. For this reason, engineers try to design stiffened shells and plates to delay permanent deformation (bending). This means much more stress can be applied before bending occurs.

Cripes I hope I am making sense here, and explaining this okay......lmao. I suddenly feel like Dr. McCoy on Star Trek---"Damn it Jim, I'm a Pilot, not an Engineer!"

There are several types of expoxies used also and matrix or resins, such as epoxies and polyamides, that are mixed with reinforcements, such as glass, boron and carbon fibers. The lightest yet obviously most durable materials ( and they have to be temperature resistant) are used and have to meet very strict mil spec and testing requirements. Right now for example, a new type of fiber compound lmainate has been developed for the wings. So the materials vary for every section of an aircraft. Keep in mind that in the aluminum alloys also contain Copper, Silicon, Manganese, Magnesium and Chromium.

So basically, Most of the structural components of an airplane are made of metallic materials. An aluminum alloy is used on most metallic components, because it is relatively light weight. Remember, the lighter the plane, the farther it can fly, or the less fuel it will need. Yet, aluminum is strong enough to carry heavy loads. Steel is used for a smaller number of components that are exposed to heavy loads. Landing gears, engine fittings, and the tracks that the flaps move along are usually made of steel. Since aluminum and steel tend to lose their strength at high temperatures, titanium is used around engines, for firewalls and hot ducts.

More and more, composite materials are being used for some components. Composite materials (two or more materials bonded together) are made of fibers of boron or graphite embedded in a layer of epoxy (glue). The strength along the fibers is very, very large, but is not very high across them. Most composite materials then, are created by layering the thin sheets with the fibers alternating directions. The resulting material is very strong in all directions. These materials are very light and stiff. They help reduce the weight of the airplane structure.

When pieces or sections are separated from the aircraft, many of them will float especially due to what type insulation that piece or section has in t and it's structure, size and the type of materials in the structure.

It's amazing when you think of the Wright Brothers plane which was a wooden structure (spruce), the wings covered in a muslin fabric used to make women's underwear, twine, home made cables, and some sheet steel.

Theophilus wrote:

CarolinaHound wrote:Are those things made of metal or fiberglass? I wouldn't think the wreckage would float like that, and the way it's torn looks more like fibergalss. I thought planes were made of metal. Sorry if that's a stupid question, but like I said, save one short (thank God) hop in a single engine, the only planes I've been near were made of plastic, and I either glued or snaped them together.

I found it funny the pilot called it a hop. Was more like a hell ride down a potholed dirt road on a harley with bad springs. lol

No the heavies use what they can to reduce weight. Though there is only so much you can do with this concern. (According to design) and I will even ask put it out there baby on this one. The planes are designed to carry the weight of the passengers.

I am starting to think pilot error on this. I think we are putting to much pressure on new people to fill the seats. I believe this was pilot error. The pilots of that aircraft did not do their job. They failed, and in the mean time 200+ people lost lives due to pilots not knowing what the hell they were doing.

I cannot totally agree on pilot error at this point as the sole cause of anything. No one can. Something horribly bad went wrong here. We know that. We have the ACARS messages. We have the questions of the storms however. Did something develope very rapidly that the plane could not handle? What about ther tubes? You cannot fly a plane very well if you have no clue how fast you are going at that altitude in the dark, that's a fact. I believe there is a combination of issues here at play. Did the plane's systems fail? Yes many of them did. Why? We don't know yet. Was there a structural failure? And why? Both the Captain and the FO had spotless records and many years of flying and many hours on the bus. These guys were very seasoned and they were not "new" in any sense of the word.

It takes a long time to become a Captain by the way, loads of constant training, experience, hours, massive amounts of education (which is ongoing) and more. This does not happen overnight. Some incredible FO's are in their seats for a decade or more before becomming a Captain and some never get the chance. Pilots train constantly in simulators (and with manuals and are tested often). They have medicals every year and I mean strict medicals. They are regulated to the inth and scrutinized like bacteria under a microscope every damn day of their lives. The standards are very strict. If you fart, someone at the FAA knows about it.

Are you aware of how many instances due to outside of the Pilot's control (birds, fires, weather, mechanical, electrical, Air Traffic Control, radar issues, etc. ) occurr on a reguar basis (some more spectactular than others- such as what happened on the Hudson recently) and the Captain and crew do everything right and save lives? Worldwide this happens a helluva lot more often than you think, believe me. I have had the experience several times in my own career. There are few pilots out there that haven't.

It is totally out of line at this point to make the statement "The pilots of that aircraft did not do their job. They failed, and in the mean time 200+ people lost lives due to pilots not knowing what the hell they were doing."

Fewer Airline Crashes Linked To "Pilot Error"; Inclement Weather Still Major Factor
ScienceDaily (Jan. 9, 2001) — A scientific study of aviation crashes in the United States concludes that "pilot error" is a decreasing cause of crashes involving major airlines.

Johns Hopkins researchers report that pilot error accounted for 34 percent of major airline crashes between 1990 and 1996, compared with 43 percent from 1983 to 1989. This continues a downward trend that began in the 1960s, when pilot error was a factor in an estimated 45 to 67 percent of airline crashes, the authors say.

"It's very encouraging that pilot error is decreasing as a cause of crashes of commercial flights," says Guohua Li, M.D., Dr.P.H., associate professor of emergency medicine and lead author of the study. "This decline is possibly due to increased use of advanced technologies and improved crew training."

The report, published in the January issue of Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, also found that weather continues to be a significant factor in pilot error. Crashes in conditions of poor visibility that forced a pilot to rely on instrument navigation were nearly four times more likely to involve pilot error than those in which the pilot could see clearly.

"We observed a very high correlation between bad weather and pilot error," says Susan P. Baker, M.P.H., another author of the study and professor of health policy and management at Hopkins' School of Public Health. "The primary cause was the pilot's inability to deal with the weather – as the situations became more demanding, the risk of error increased. Improving our ability to predict poor weather conditions and providing better guidance to pilots in those situations warrants attention."

Li, Baker and their colleagues studied files compiled by the National Transportation Safety Board of crashes in three categories: major airlines, commuter/air taxis and general aviation (defined as personal business flights, corporate/executive flights and instructional flights, among others). They studied the sequence of events leading to the crashes and developed a mathematical model to predict the likelihood of pilot error.

Overall, 371 major airline crashes, 1,735 commuter/air taxi crashes and 29,798 general aviation crashes were reported between 1983 and 1996 (incidents resulting in only minor damage to the aircraft were excluded). Of those, pilot error was listed as a probable cause for 38 percent of major airline crashes, 74 percent of commuter/air taxi crashes and 85 percent of general aviation crashes. Other findings of the study include:


* More than half (53 percent) of fatal major airline crashes were attributed to pilot error, compared with 36 percent of nonfatal major airline crashes. The prevalence of pilot error also was significantly higher in fatal commuter/air taxi crashes and general aviation crashes.

* 45 percent of major airline crashes occurring at airports were caused by pilot error, compared with 28 percent of those occurring elsewhere.

and Pilot errors are down even further currently:

Pilot Error Rate Falls in U.S. Airline Accidents
By Chris Kjelgaard, Senior Editor

posted: 28 December 2007 12:01 am ET


Pilot error is probably much less of a factor in mishaps involving U.S. airliners now than it was in the early 1980s, a new study suggests.

The study, by researchers at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, discovered that the number of U.S. airline accidents due to pilot error "significantly declined" between 1983 and 2002.

Although the overall rate of U.S. airline accidents remained stable throughout the period, the proportion of mishaps involving pilot error decreased 40 percent, they found.

"A 40 percent decline in pilot error-related mishaps is very impressive. Pilot error has long been considered the most prominent contributor to aviation crashes," said Susan Baker, the lead author of the study, published in the January 2008 edition of Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine.

The researchers defined a mishap as being any U.S. airline safety event that the NTSB officially recorded as an accident, because it involved serious injury to one or more persons or significant damage to an airliner. The airlines included were any that were defined as scheduled or unscheduled U.S. air carriers under Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

Although the long-term study didn't take into account any NTSB accident data after 2002, it's likely the reduction in pilot error that the researchers found has continued to the present day -- even though the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found pilot error was primarily to blame for last year's Comair crash at Lexington, Ky., in which 49 people died.

Cockpit resource management a factor

Baker attributes the significant decline in pilot-error-related accidents to improvements in pilot training, flight deck technology and the development of cockpit resource management (CRM) techniques. CRM is a crew-coordination discipline that came into being in the 1980s and the FAA, the NTSB and all U.S. and major international airlines emphasize it strongly today.

"We saw a reduction in pilot error crashes where crew interaction was a factor. That, and weather-related decisions," said Baker. "Trends indicate that great progress has been made to improve the decision-making of pilots and coordination between the aircraft's crew members."

Significant improvements in flight deck technology between 1983 and 2002 particularly contributed to the improvement in weather-related decision-making, she added.

The researchers analyzed 558 separate accidents. "A lot were not airplane crashes," said Baker. "Maybe a quarter involved turbulence." Many others involved accidents while aircraft were sitting at the gate or being pushed back for departure.

And for current statics:

Causes of Fatal Accidents by Decade (percentage) NTSB:


Cause 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s All
Pilot Error 40 32 24 25 27 25 29
Pilot Error (weather related) 11 18 14 17 21 17 16
Pilot Error (mechanical related) 7 5 4 2 4 3 4
Total Pilot Error 58 57 42 44 53 45 50
Other Human Error 0 8 9 6 8 9 7
Weather 16 10 13 15 9 8 12
Mechanical Failure 21 20 23 21 21 28 22
Sabotage 5 5 11 13 10 9 9
Other Cause 0 2 2 1 0 1 1



Type of Flight Fatalities per million flight hours
Airliner (Scheduled and nonscheduled Part 121) 4.03
Commuter Airline (Scheduled Part 135) 10.74
Commuter Plane (Nonscheduled Part 135 - Air taxi on demand) 12.24
General Aviation (Private Part 91) 22.43

You can clearly see that the statistics of fatal crashes considering the thousands of flights globally every single day, 24/7 in every type of weather imagineable is still very very very small. I am not trying to lesson the impact of even one death caused by any plane incident either here.

According to the NTSB, you have a 1 in 13.57 million of being killed on any flight!

And here is a real eye opener for you:

Notable Accident Causes by Category (and these are only the serious/major events resulting in loss of life listed below, injury or are clasified as a severe event w/o loss of life- here btw- there are plenty of more events which occurr every single year also that have nothing whatsoever to do with pilot error)

Air Traffic Control Error
09/03/1929 Mt. Taylor, New Mexico Trans Con. Air Transport
06/13/1947 Leesburg, Virginia Pen Central Air
11/11/1949 Arlington, Virginia Eastern / U.S. AF
04/14/1958 Castel de Fels, Spain Aviaco
07/21/1961 Shemya, Alaska Alaska AL
02/08/1965 New York, New York Eastern AL
03/05/1969 San Juan, Puerto Rico Prinair
01/14/1970 Mt. Pumacona, Peru Faucett
02/06/1970 Samarkand, USSR Aeroflot
12/20/1972 Chicago, Illinois Delta/North Central
09/09/1976 Adler, Russia Aeroflot / Aeroflot
09/10/1976 Gaj, Yugoslavia Inex / British AW
08/11/1979 Dneprodzerzhinsk, USSR Aeroflot
04/19/1983 Keninakan, Russia Aeroflot
02/01/1991 Los Angeles, California USAir/Skywest
05/19/1993 Medellin, Colombia SAM
11/07/1996 Lagos, Nigeria Aviation Dev. Corp.
09/26/1997 Buah Nabar, Indonesia Garuda Indonesian AL
07/01/2002 Uberlinger, Germany Bashkirian AL / DHL

Bird Strike
10/04/1960 Boston, Massachusetts Eastern AL
11/23/1962 Ellicott, Maryland United AL
09/15/1988 Bahar Dar, Ethiopia Ethiopian AL
04/18/1990 Off Panama Aero Perlas
09/22/1995 Anchorage, Alaska U.S. Air Force
04/19/2000 Pepo, Congo Centrafricain Airlines
01/25/2007 Pau, France Reg Comp Aer Eur
01/15/2009 New York, New York US Airways

Cargo Hold / Cabin Fire
07/09/1945 Florence, South Carolina Eastern AL
06/17/1948 Mt. Carmel, Pennsylvania United AL
08/02/1949 Jaquirana, Brazil Varig
01/09/1964 Zarate, Argentina Aero Litoral Argentina
07/09/1964 Parrottsville, Tennesee United AL
07/26/1969 Biskra, Algeria Air Algerie
08/14/1972 Konigs, East Germany Interflug
08/31/1972 Magnitogorsk, Russia Aeroflot
07/11/1973 Paris, Orly, France Varig
11/03/1973 Boston, Massachusetts Pan American
11/26/1979 Ta'if, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Pakistan Inter. AL
08/19/1980 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabian AL
12/24/1982 Guangzhou, China CAAC
06/02/1983 Covington, Kentucky Air Canada
07/02/1986 Syktyvar, Russia Aeroflot
05/09/1987 Warsaw, Poland LOT
11/28/1987 Mauritius, Indian Ocean South African Airways
01/13/1990 Pervouralsk, Russia Aeroflot
07/12/1995 Gumey, New Guinea Milne Bay Air
05/11/1996 Everglades, Florida ValuJjet
09/02/1998 Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia Swissair
05/07/2002 Off Dalian, China China Northern Airlines

Design Flaw
03/31/1933 Bazaar, Kansas Trans Cont. & West AW
10/24/1947 Bryce Canyon, Utah United AL
11/11/1947 Gallup, New Mexico American AL
06/17/1948 Mt. Carmel, Pennsylvania United AL
08/29/1948 Winona, Minnesota Northwest Orient AL
05/02/1953 Jalalogori, India British Overseas AW
01/10/1954 Elba, Italy British Overseas AW
04/08/1954 Off Stromboli, Italy Trans Canada AL
02/05/1955 Calabar, Nigeria West African AW
09/29/1959 Buffalo, Texas Braniff AL
03/17/1960 Tell City, Indiana Northwest Orient AL
07/05/1970 Toronto, Canada Air Canada
03/03/1974 Ermenonville, France Turkish AL
07/06/1982 Moscow, Russia Aeroflot
07/30/1992 New York, New York Trans World AL
04/06/1993 Over the Pacific Ocean China Eastern AL
03/03/1991 Colorado Springs, Colorado United AL
09/08/1994 Aliquippa, Pennsylvania USair
12/05/1997 Irkutsk, Russia Russian Air Force

Sabotage / Explosive Device
03/28/1933 Dixmude, Belgium Imperial AW
10/10/1933 Chesterton, Indiana United AL
05/07/1949 Sibuyan Sea, Philippines Phillipine AL
09/09/1949 Sault-aux-Cochons, Canada Canadian Pacific AL
08/12/1952 Palmeria de Goias, Brazil Trans Aero Nac.
04/11/1955 Great Natuna Island, Sarawak Air India
11/01/1955 Longmont, Colorado United AL
07/25/1957 Daggett, California Western AL
04/17/1959 Puerto Kino,Mexico Tigres Voladores
09/08/1959 Poza Rica, Mexico Mexicana
11/16/1959 Gulf of Mexico National AL
01/06/1960 Bolivia, North Carolina National AL
05/10/1961 In Amenas, Libya Air France
05/22/1962 Unionville, Missouri Continental AL
12/08/1964 Tripuani, Bolivia Aerolineas Abaroa
07/08/1965 Dog Creek, British Columbia Canadian Pacific AL
11/22/1966 Aden, Yemen Aden AW
02/09/1967 Mexico City, Mexico Cubana
10/12/1967 Rhodes, Greece British European AW
12/22/1969 Nha Trang, Vietnam Air Vietnam
02/21/1970 Zurich, Switzerland Swissair
04/21/1970 Manila, Philippines Philippine AL
11/21/1971 Penhu Island, Taiwan China AL
01/26/1972 Hermsdorf, Czechoslovakia JAT
06/15/1972 Pleiku, Vietnam Cathay Pacific AW
03/19/1973 Ben Me Thout, South Vietnam Air Vietnam
04/21/1973 Patabangan, Philippines Philippine AL
12/17/1973 Rome, Italy Pan American AW
09/08/1974 Ionian Sea, Greece Trans World AL
01/01/1976 Al Qaysumah, Saudi Arabia Middle East AL
10/06/1976 Bridgetown, Barbados Cubana
02/19/1979 Barentu, Ethiopia Ethiopian Airlines
06/27/1980 Tyrrhenian Sea, Italy Itavia
12/21/1980 Rio Hacha, Colombia Trans. Aereos del Caribe
09/23/1983 Mina Jebel Ali, UAE Gulf Air
06/23/1985 Atlantic Ocean, Ireland Air India
04/02/1986 Athens, Greece Trans World AL
05/03/1986 Colombo, Sri Lanka Air Lanka
11/29/1987 Andaman Sea Korean AL
03/01/1988 Johannesberg, South Africa Comair
08/17/1988 Bahawalpur, Pakistan Pakistan Air Force
12/21/1988 Lockerbie, Scotland Pan American AW
09/19/1989 Bilma, Niger Union des Trans. Aeriens
11/27/1989 Bogota, Colombia Avianca
07/19/1994 Colon, Panama Alas Chiricanas
12/11/1994 Pacific Ocean, Okinawa Philippine AL
07/09/1997 Suzano, Brazil TAM
03/03/2001 Bangkok, Thailand Thai Airways
05/07/2002 Off Dalian, China China Northern Airlines
08/24/2004 Toula, Russia Volga-Avia Express
08/24/2004 Rostov-on-Don, Russia Sibir Airlines

Fuel Starvation
05/18/1935 Knowles Flying Service Flint, Michigan
12/31/1935 Imperial Airways Alexandria, Egypt
05/06/1936 Macon, Missouri Transcon. & West. Air
01/14/1936 Goodwin, Arkansas American AL
07/02/1937 Lae, New Guinea Purdue Res. Found.
11/28/1938 Off Point Reyes, Calif. United Air Lines
02/09/1943 Gander, Newfoundland British Overseas AW
12/28/1946 Michigan City, Michigan American AL
01/05/1947 Carmel, New Jersey Nationwide Air Trans.
01/11/1947 Lympne, England BOAC
01/07/1948 Savannah, Georgia Coastal Air Lines
01/30/1948 Near Bermuda British So. Am. AW
12/28/1948 San Juan, Puerto Rico Airborne Transport
08/15/1949 Lurga Point, Ireland Transocean Air Lines
07/28/1950 Porte Alegre, Brazil Penair do Brasil
04/30/1952 Delhi, India Deccan, AW
05/26/1952 Atar, Mauritania British Overseas Airways
06/19/1954 Folkestone, England Swissair
12/22/1954 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Johnson Flying Service
04/04/1967 Stockport, England British Midland AW
05/02/1970 St. Croix, Virgin Islands Antillian AL
12/05/1970 Delhi, India Jamair
02/01/1972 Tegal, Indonesia Penas
07/24/1973 Honolulu, HI Air Hawaii
08/11/1974 Ouagadougou, Upper Volta Air Mali
10/20/1977 Gillsburg, Mississippi L & J Company
12/02/1977 Al Bayda, Lebanon Balkan Bulgarian AL
12/28/1978 Portland, Oregon United AL
09/04/1982 Rio Branco, Brazil Cia Bras. de Tratores
07/23/1983 Gimli, Manitoba, Canada Air Canada
09/03/1989 Sao Jose do Xingu, Brazil Varig
01/25/1990 Cove Neck, New York Avianca
09/11/1990 Off Newfoundland, Canada Faucett
06/26/1991 Sokotu, Nigeria Okada Air
11/15/1993 Kerman, Iran Magistralnye Avialinii
09/18/1994 Tamanrasset, Algeria Oriental AL
09/26/1994 Vanavera, Russia Cheremshanka AL
09/11/1995 Jalalabad, Afghanistan Ariana Afghan AL
10/31/1995 Piedras Negras, Mexico TACSA
04/05/1996 Petropavlovsk, Russia Krasnoyarskie AV
01/13/1998 Tor Kach, Pakistan Ariana Afghan AL
03/24/2000 Kadirana, Sri Lanka OMSK
06/11/2002 Winnipeg, Manitoba Keystone Air Services
11/11/2002 Manila, Philippines Laoag Int. Airlines
08/13/2004 Cincinnati, Ohio Air Tacoma
08/06/2005 Off Palermo, Italy Tuninter

Hijacking (resulting in fatalities)
07/16/1948 Pacific Ocean Cathay Pacific AW
11/01/1958 Nipe Bay, Cuba Cubana
04/28/1960 Calabozo, Venezuela Linea Aero. Venezolana
1/23/1971 Korean Air Lines Sokcho, South Korea
12/06/1971 Tikaka, Sudan Sudan AW
05/18/1973 Chita, Russia Aeroflot
09/15/1974 Phan Rang, Vietnam Air Vietnam
05/23/1976 Zamboanga, Philippines Philippine AL
06/27/1976 Entebbe, Uganda Air France
12/04/1977 Kampung Ladang, Malaysia Malaysia AL
06/14/1985 Athens, Greece Trans World AL
11/24/1985 Luqa, Malta Egyptair
09/05/1986 Karachi, Pakistan Pan American AW
12/25/1986 Ay, Saudi Arabia Iraqi AW
07/24/1987 Geneva, Switzerland Air Afrique
04/05/1988 Combi, Cyprus Kuwait AW
10/02/1990 Guangzhou, China Xiamen/China SW AL
08/28/1993 Khorag, Tajikistan Tadzhikistan Nat. AL
12/26/1994 Algiers, Algeria Air France
11/23/1996 Moroni, Comoros Islands Ethiopian AL
07/23/1999 Tokyo, Japan All Nippon AW
12/24/1999 Amritsar, India Indian Airlines
05/25/2000 Manila, Philippines Philippine Air Lines
03/15/2001 Medina, Saudi Arabia Vnukovo Airlines
09/11/2001 New York, New York American AL
09/11/2001 New York, New York United AL
09/11/2001 Arlington, Virginia American AL
09/11/2001 Shanksville, Pennsylvania United AL

Lightning
07/22/1938 Stulpica, Romania LOT
08/31/1940 Lovettsville, Virginia Penn Central AL
01/17/1951 Civitavecchia, Italy Alitalia
06/26/1959 Varese, Italy Trans World AL
08/29/1960 Dakar, Senegal Air France
07/19/1961 Azul, Brazil Aerolineas Argentinas
12/19/1962 Warsaw, Poland LOT
08/12/1963 Lyon, France Air Inter
12/08/1963 Elkton, Maryland Pan American AW
12/24/1971 Puerto Inca, Peru Lineas Aereas Nac.
05/09/1976 Madrid, Spain Iran Air Force
05/09/1980 Montelimar, France Kuwait Air Force
02/08/1988 Mulheim, Germany NFD
06/22/2000 Shitai, China Wuhan AL

Pilot Incapacitation
10/30/1959 Waynesborough, Virginia Piedmont AL
12/14/1962 Burbank, California Flying Tiger Line
10/06/1965 Centennial, Wyoming United AL
04/22/1966 Ardmore, Oklahoma American Flyers AL
03/13/1967 East London, South Africa South African AW
01/14/1970 Mt. Pumacona, Peru Faucett
06/18/1972 Staines, Surrey, England British European AW
10/13/1972 Krasnaya, Polyana, USSR Aeroflot
02/09/1982 Tokyo, Japan Japan AL
03/31/1995 Balotesti, Romania Trans. Aeeriene Rom.
09/04/2000 Near Burketown, Australia Central Air
08/14/2005 Grammatikos, Greece Helios Airways

Pilots Shot by Passenger
05/07/1964 San Ramon, California Pacific AL
12/04/1977 Kampung Ladang, Malaysia Malaysian AL
12/07/1987 San Luis Obispo, California Pacific Southwest AL

Now let's blame the pilots some more when we have so little to base such a total conclusion from.

Cool. Thanks guys. Made perfect sense Put it out there baby. It was just the way the material was torn looked simular to the way some boats I've seen damaged tore.
You'd be amazed at what damage a boat trailer can do to the boat if the person trying to guide the boat to the trailer decides to save a few feet of wenching the boat onto the trailer by trying to drive the boat all the way onto the trailer. Give a dummy a toy and he find away to be a dummy.

I'd imagine when piloting a plane a lot of different things can go wrong. Like I said, one or two things go wrong and there may not be much problem. But when you got a dozen things against you popping up all at the same time: soon as you start trying to correct one problem another pops up before you can get the first under control, then another does the same. Even a top-notch crew can only do so much.

And it all depends on WHAT goes wrong rather than how many things. Several major issues at one time and/or in close sequence are likely what occurred with Air France. We need to know the exact start of the problems and what transpired. You can bet your ass that many severe events transpired in a manner of just minutes too. Limited time is a terrible factor to try and correct any one horrendous problem, let alone several because much more can occur while you are trying to do this, leading to an obvious unrecoverable cascade of failures and events.

Well it would appear I am grasping at straws. though I will not be deterred from saying something that may be uncomfortable. As pilot error has to be something we look at. Did you see the part of my post were I talked about training? Now I am not slamming pilots here as being wrong. I am saying they did what they could with the training they had. So I feel this leads to pilot error. Now they did do everything they could within their training to save that plane? Damn yes they did. They did everything they were trained to do, and yet their training fell short.

If there is one thing I know about about you PIOTB. You would never put your crew in a situation such as this. Why? Is this because you just don't relay on the data you have. I don't really know you that well. Though something tells me you have instincts. Instincts with the combination of experience that you have to to know a possible situation that could effect your craft.

You would never let something like this happen. Not in a million years would you let something like this happen under your watch.

So do not discount my theory of pilot error. I feel training must be far from what is really necessary. The fact that we don't have many more aircraft falling out of the sky is genius in the manufacturing in the design.

This more than likely has lead to laziness among some pilots.

So there is a feeling among pilots that nothing can go wrong.

Now when something did go really wrong. For example the Air France flight. The training was not there. The pilots as far as I am concerned were doing what they did on most flights............. Sleep.

So when problems happened they were way to far behind to do anything.



Though I will not sway away from something as uncomfortable as this subject.

I am not discounting pilot error. I am simply stating that we don't know if that was the cause. There are things mechanically, weather wise, electronically and system wise that can occur which no pilot on the face of the planet can overcome ever.

On long intercontinental flights there are always 2 to 3 pilots depending on the size of the aircraft. The buses have 3 and sometimes 4. Crew rest areas are put in place to help oversome fatique and bio rhythm issues. Only one pilot at any time is alseep or resting. On a bus, for example that leaves 2 to 3 on duty. They all alternate their breaks as does the cabin crew. But then you have to consider where the Crew Station is on a bus. Is is behind the flight deck? Hell no. That would take up vauleable room for more passengers. Think money. It's below, forward of the cargo hold.

You are better off to examine the design of the bus and it's systems and the Airbus philosophy:

Airbus relies on electronic rather than hydraulic or mechanical systems to control the aircraft.

It's akin to having a computer control your car, with the electronic brain doing the steering, hitting the gas and pumping the brakes as you tell it what to do.

Some pilots claim the old way was better. In an emergency, they say, passengers are better off having a skilled pilot working all the systems.
But planes built by Airbus, give computers, not humans, the final authority on flight decisions.

Airbus' American rival, Boeing, also uses fly-by-wire systems on its newest planes, but their pilots have the ability to override the computers in an emergency.

As Airbus puts it, the "deflections of the flying control surfaces on the wing and tail are no longer driven directly by the pilots' controls, but by a computer which calculates exactly which control surfaces are needed to make the aircraft respond as the pilot wishes."

Because the computer "drives," Airbus says the system leads to "considerable reductions in the time and costs involved in training pilots and crew to operate" its planes.

Boeing uses fly-by-wire technology on its 777 jets and will also have it on its next-generation 787s, due out early next year.

Airbus uses it on its A320, A330 and A340 models, as well as the giant double-decker A380 jumbo jet, which began flying in late 2007.

Older commercial aircraft, including Boeing 747s, Lockheed Martin L-1011s and McDonnell Douglas DC-10s, use hydraulic controls.

Kevin Darcy, a licensed commercial pilot and former accident investigator for Boeing, said fly-by-wire and hydraulic systems both have inherent advantages.

"For instance, the Airbus system may prevent you from intentionally overloading the airplane." "The Boeing approach is to give you plenty of warning that you reached the limit, but if you insist on doing it, the airplane will let you do it."

In short, Boeing's design gives a "little bit more control to the pilot," Darcy said.
"But that's not to say that I endorse one over the other," he continued. "There's logic to both systems, and I can't say that one is better than the other."

Darcy, who now heads Safety Services International, an aviation consulting firm, said as systems fail on a fly-by-wire system, as they did on Flight 447, ultimate control shifts from pilot to computer.

"We don't really know what that means," Darcy said. "There was something going on that caused it to go into the lower modes and we don't know what that is. Without getting the flight data recorder, it's too difficult for anybody to get a clear understanding of what happened."

But some pilots have expressed concerns about the fly-by-wire system on industry blogs, some expressing fears that airplanes are becoming too automated. This includes myself by the way.

Other former pilots contacted said that in an emergency, they'd rather not have to rely on a computer.

Jerry Sorlucco, a former US Airways captain who largely flew Boeing 767s, said although he's never flown an Airbus, he prefers not to rely on fly-by-wire technology.

"Given the preference, I'd prefer the Boeing concept, where the pilot retains more control and you're not putting stuff through funky computers." "I don't like the idea of not being able to override systems that are built into the aircraft."

Sorlucco, who retired in 1997 after more than 37 years in aviation, acknowledged that Airbus manufactures a "wonderful product," adding that answers to the mystery of what downed Air France Flight 447 won't be known until its black boxes are located.

"It’s a hazardous environment no matter what kinds of systems you have, and there's any number of things that can put an airplane in trouble," he said. "But it's very important that they get the black box at the bottom of the ocean because there's a lot of Airbuses flying around."

John Cox, a former commercial airline pilot who has performed simulated flights on the Airbus A330, said he's heard plenty of feedback on the technology as head of Safety Operating Systems, a Washington, D.C.-based aviation consulting firm.

"You'll hear a lot of concern among professional pilots that the final authority may not rest with the pilots, But that is under the normal system; there are alternative systems that have a degradation in the protections."

Investigators have analyzed 24 automatic messages that Flight 447 sent during its last minutes of flight.

The signals show that the plane's autopilot was not engaged, but it is unclear whether it was switched off by the pilots themselves or had stopped working due to conflicting airspeed readings.

Mary Anne Greczyn, an Airbus spokeswoman, said fly-by-wire technology was introduced by the company in 1988 with the A320 and has been used on every subsequent Airbus aircraft.

"The system, originally used in military aircraft many years before it was adopted for use in the commercial market, replaces the old-school mechanical flight control system of cables and pulleys, which are physically manipulated by a yoke. In FBW, an electronic signaling system sends the pilot's input via wires, to the actuators that move the control surfaces of the aircraft."

Among a fly-by-wire system's benefits are weight savings and flight envelope protection, or keeping the aircraft within safe operating parameters, Greczyn said.

Again, that is fine in a perfect sceanrio but not in an imperfect one.

In other words, the system is meant to cut down on human error by not letting a pilot maneuver the plane into extreme degrees of roll, pitch or yaw that would endanger the aircraft's structural integrity.

At least in theory, that is Air Bus philosophy in my opinion.

"The system maximizes safe control of the aircraft — for instance, in the case of the loss of reliable speed data, the autopilot turns off and gives control back to the pilot," Greczyn's statement continued.

Greczyn said fly-by-wire has no disadvantages and that no plans exist to issue "any sort" of alert the system.

Asked if a pilot can disengage the fly-by-wire system in the event of an emergency like the one experienced by Flight 447, Grecyzn replied, "It's akin to shutting off your ABS in your car as you are skidding on ice. You can do it, but you wouldn't want to."

Now this is all the Air Bus/PR mode of thinking, remember.

Jim Proulx, a Boeing spokesman, declined to comment on the "philosophical difference" between the two designs, but he stressed that a pilot always has the final say in a Boeing aircraft.

"A Boeing pilot can always override any input in the airplane," The pilot is the ultimate authority in the airplane."

I will tell you that many pilots (including myself) that I know personally and others that I know and have spoken with on forums, and still others that I have seen post on forums prefer Boeing because of this issue.

In 2000, Capt. Paul McCarthy, then the group's executive air safety chairman, told the Seattle Post-Intelligencer that its pilots had "strong opinions" on the issue.

Brother, that was putting it mildly. lol

"There are good arguments on both sides," McCarthy told the paper. "Both make legitimate points. And both sides are correct ... It's a good, healthy debate that will continue for the next five to 10 years until everyone is confident which way we should go."

Any pilot that has flown commercially and gets to that level, for more than one year, knows full well that anything that can happen at anytime and has most likely experienced some of the events already.......with other planes, the weather, Air Traffic Control, the passengers, birds, his own plane, etc., you name it. You have no idea how many things happen that are out of your control....weather that is unpredictable, icing, wind shear and sudden updrafts, fires, engine failures, fuel issues, landing gear and tire issues, a huge plethora of issues. Pilots for the most part, deal with these issues and do it safely. Don't sell them short.

I have sat at many on many a runway in a blizzard, or an ice storm and had to be de-iced from the runway for the second or third time and said fuck it, called the Tower and refused to go only to have the the airport shut down 15 minutes later. I have done this more than once, I can assure you due to many types severe weather issues. I have had my ass chewed and written up for this as well and once I was actually put on leave for this. I didn't give a crap either. Most pilots will do the same, but not all of them, this is fact.

You have no idea the pressure pilots are under by their employer to make and keep their schedules at all costs. You have no idea how in the old days Pilots did not get the extended layovers that they always needed either. It was always all about get them on a return flight or an extension flight and do it in a hurry. It all quit being the friendly skies when it turned into mergers, aquisitions, cutbacks, big corporations, and the cutting of corners, the lessening of pilots, cabin crews and maintainace crews to have a fair voice. You would faint at what Air Traffic Controllers have been through and go through.

One concern I do have with this flight is it's altitude at the time of what ever incidents(s) occured.

The plane was flying ever so close to its maximum altitude – in a zone pilots call the “Coffin Corner”. It refers to the edge of so-called “flight envelope” of an aircraft. At this altitude, the air is much thinner and that significantly narrows the swath of speed at which the airplane can safely operate.

Because there are relatively few air molecules passing over the wings, they need to be moving faster to generate enough lift to keep the plane at altitude. They will stop flying (stall) at a much higher speed (true airspeed) than they would on approach to an airport at sea level.

At the other end of the safe speed spectrum is the sound barrier. The wings on an airliner like the A-330 are not designed to break the speed of sound. Venture toward Chuck Yeager country and an airliner will begin buffeting. And as altitude increases, the buffet speed (the sound barrier) decreases (once again the dearth of air molecules is to blame).

So you see the squeeze play as a plane flies toward the Coffin Corner: the margin between the between the high and low speed limits gets thinner and thinner (along with the air).

Matter of fact, given its estimated weight, altitude and the outside air temperature (which also affects air density), AF 447 was flying through the eye of a speed needle only about 25 knots (28 mph) wide.

As jet engines fly higher, they steadily lose their oomph ( thin air). Actually, the maximum altitude a plane can safely fly is partially determined by the point where the engines can no longer maintain a minimum rate of climb. In other words, you are supposed to level off before this happens.

So while you are napping, eating or watching a movie on that flight to LAX, you should know the plane you are flying is cruising along at the ratty edge of its capabilities. Why? Money. The higher an airliner flies, the better fuel mileage it gets.

However, flying in the “Corner” is routine and safe - so long as the weather is benign, the air is smooth and the sensors, avionics, computers and autopilot are all doing their job. When something goes wrong however, you may be screwed.

Was this the case for AF 447?

We don't know. Was it safe for the weather? We don't know. We do know it was a mesoscale convective system of storms. Because big thunderstorms are common there, ( and in many places in the U.S. and globally) pilots are constantly threading their way through the nastiest cells – deviating at their discretion. What ever they saw and were told in their pre-flight had already changed and possibly worsened over 4 hours into their fight.

Then we get into the whole radar and visual thing that I spoke of in one of my first posts on here.

And if there was an issue with the pitos than this would have been horrendous. Add the possibility turbulance, ice, hail and what all that we have no clue of. You just cannot take control of a plane and start manuering it any which way you want to a these altitudes and at these speeds. It is not like driving a car. The margin to do this safely areodynamically speaking is very very very small. Many things can cause a roll, a yawl, or a stall in these types of scenarios.

And consider this, updrafts bring warm moist air to higher altitudes - feeding the storm. That also might have increased the air temperature where the Airbus was flying. Warmer air is less dense - with fewer molecules - meaning the airliner might have suddenly been flying above its maximum safe altitude.

There are so many dozens and dozens of factors and pieces of information that we simply do not have. Only the FDR and the CDR have all the information needed to tell us what exactly happened. Everything else is really speculation.

There are plenty of pilots out there like me. Some are born to fly. I like to think I was. Some do have better instincts than others obviously. But isn't that true of every profession? ........Teachers, surgeons, race car drivers, policemen, any profession. There are naturals and there are those who are still excellent in their profession as well and well skilled and well trained and excellent in their chosen field. And there are the old school guys like I believe I was and am. Plenty of them still around too. But, in the current atmosphere of airline carriers, and with the new designs and automated systems of planes, they will be a thing of the past. That may not be the best scenario.

Safety was alway first for me and not the schedule no matter how much that was pushed upon me and no matter how much shit I got into because of that. I was never alone in my thinking either believe me. I had a reputation for not putting up with anything ever that might jeapordize my crew and pax, ever. I cannot tell you how many times I had an inspector and a mechanic down to the gate before, during or after loading when I discovered the pissiest thing. I did a few roll backs from the tarmac back to the gate as well. I always did this. I took a lot of shit over it too. I remember being teased once by one of the stews because one of the fridges in the galley wasn't working and she asked the FO to ask me if we were still going to leave. lol ALL good pilots did and do the exact same thing. Flying is not just a job for the vast majority of pilots. It is their life. It is their dream. It is their calling. You need to give them more of a break and some credit than you are here.

How many times do you hear the passengers pissing and moaning and complaining and grumbling and having all out shit fits when you decide not to leave the gate, not to take off, add to their flight time making them miss tight connections or be late, or have to take the time to deviate from flight paths because of weather, have to land at a different airport all together, have to have something replaced or repaired or inspected and re-tested while they are cooling their heels at the gate, have to roll back to the gate etc.???? They complain and get angry don't they? And they do it every single time. They never ever once say thanks for possibly saving our lives and being concerned for our safety do they? Never. lol Pilots get shit from all ends,believe me; from their carrier, from the FAA, from the ground crew, from the Air Traffic Control Tower, from the passegers, you name it. And let's not even get into abusive out of control passengers, drunks, those on drugs, those that have mental and or emotional issues, those that are loud and obnoxious and out of control and unruly, those that threaten and physically attack the cabin crew, those who are terrified to fly, those you become severly ill, have babies, have heart attacks, asthma attacks, diabetic issues, seizures, etc., and do every sort of behavior you can only imagine while you are in flight. It's a real picnic.

A pilot is expected to be a medic, an engineer, a fireman, a policeman, a navigator, a mechanic, and avionics expert, a meteorologist, a mathematician, a physicist, a public relations expert and more. What I can tell you is that pilots are human beings. They are not God. And an airplane is only a machine, designed, built and flown by men, not Gods. As soon as something goes terribly wrong, we forget all of that don't we?

Again, something (most likely more than one thing) may have happened on this flight that no amount of training and experience in the universe could correct.

Thanks for all the very good, and well informed posts on this subject. PIOTB. Impressive comment to say the least.

Coontie, I had a gander at the BEA prelim report recently, and it basically does not say much. They believe the plane was intact upon hitting the water. I am not so sure still myself from following more of the debris recovered, autopsies etc., the last few weeks and discussions I have been having and reading on a Pilot's forum. I just don't know of course. I am not convinced they do either. They don't believe it was the Pitot tubes either, but did not make that very definitive. How the hell would they know at this point? They may never know. In fact the report leaves more questions than it answers. It does not say much. There had to be a major stall and loss of recovery from that stall. They must have descended so very fast to even be able to recover. When things hit the fan, they only had minutes. So there is still no clue besides the ACARS messages as to why things went south and all that did go south. Weather, to me, is still a huge issue in all of this as well. I am fairly sure that the Captain was not at the controls either, seeing as how his body was recovered with one of the flight atendants. They could have been in the crew rest or the galley. Who knows. But I doubt he was at the helm and could not get there in time do to any number of scenarios.

I have a better chance of winning the lotto than they do of every finding the wreckage or the boxes now, I believe also. I imagine they will abandon the search in another week or two. There just will be no point. They don't specify the angle that the plane may have hit the water either or discuss any type of possible spin, flat or otherwise. By the damage to the recoverd tail fin and rudder, ( and the ACARS messages of vertical cabin) I am still betting tail down as first impact. It will be interesting what more comes of this.

Thanks for your comments and insight. Yes, it is a puzzling situation. Apparently they will never recoer the flight recorders. Too late now, the batteries have gone dead in the locator beacon.
It was never mentioned, but I believe that they think that one possibility could have been a bomb because of the destruction of the aircraft. It took them a long time to finally suggest that they think the aircraft hit the sea intact. Not sure what led them to finally surmise this scenario.
I imagine from time to time, especially with rougher seas and stronger underwater currents that more of the debris will emerge and perhaps some more remains, although I doubt many more intact bodies. I speculate that teh marine life if getting and extra ration of protein now from a source different than ususal...
Other than a blip in the news every now and then in regard to another piece of wreckage being salvaged I think the incident will slowly, gradually fade away.
You idea regarding the captain - I would be amazed to know this was a fact. It seems to me that he would be in the left seat, tending teh aircraft at that juncture as I think, at the most, that they were only about 90 minutes into the long flight across teh Atlantic. But then, as humans go, who really knows what he was up to.
I always consider it a scary situation to consider that especially during a trans-atlantic flight the aircraft iis minding itself, while the crew is asleep. However, some question: "what's wrong with that?" Aircraft fly these routes by theirself all of the time and wake the crew up when a certain destination preset proximity alarm sounds.
THat brings up another thought: of course your job wont be threatened, but consider the day that and aircraft is toally automatic and there is no flight crew. They launch and recover the thing from the ground. The passangers just along for the ride - literally! ONly other individuals besides passanger will be several security people to make sure no one creates havoc or such...

Well, I cannot imagine that he was on the flight deck because he was found in a group of bodies that also contained one of the Flight Attendants and none of the other Flight Crew has been found. Also recovered in the area, was part of the Crew Rest Station. Also recovered was one of the galleys and it was very intact, and even had the trolly trays in the drawers. It is a separate and one piece modular unit that is fitted into the aircraft, but it was a surprise and it made me believe two things. 1. That the aircraft fractured and separated at this area and the galley fell out at this break (and this either happened upon impact or just before impact). Now, that would have left the two First Officers on the Flight deck. (Hopefully- I cannot imagine a scenario where the two of them were not there, one in the left seat and one in the right. 2. I can imagine easily that if the Captain was in the crew rest, that he would not have been able to make it back to the flight deck as the rest is below deck in the cargo hold area. Even if he was in the galley, who knows how violent the aircraft could have been behaving at this point, the g forces involved, possibly some decompression issues and/ or injuries and he simply could not get to the deck again for a variety of reasons.

Actually they were I believe, about 4 and 1/2 hours into the flight. However with the weather issues in the area, I cannot believe he was NOT in the flight deck but I do now believe that he was most likely not. This may explain why the hell they were flying into the systems that they were to begin with.

It is inconceivable to me that experienced pilots would not have searched exhaustively for wx returns at extreme radar range when approaching the notified presence of ITCZ activity. It is reported that a turbulence report was made 10 minutes prior to the ACARs download.

It is quite likely that they flew unintentionally into a CB. The four following flights including the one just behind them and in addition, a fifth flight, just in front of them, ALL experienced mild to moderate turbulance and they ALL deviated around the wx systems. AF447 did not. I find that very telling.

Was the turbulance enough to cause a stall at their altitude and speed? Most certainly, especially with a combo of some system failures and false readings. This was a significant series of bad events. That can be certainly surmise. The exact cause(s)??? Weather, turbulance, obvious loss of control, computer failures, a multitude of issues as possibilities. Were they trying to recover from a stall and simply ran out of air space because they had unintentionally descended so rapidly and lost so much altitude? Also a possibility. They could have even started a climb back up after decending when they hit the surface of the sea, tail down. It was pitch black out with no horizon available to them and apparently crap readings along with hell rapid descent. Could turbulance/ up drafts, down drafts, shears (God knows what) from a CB have thrown them over into the "coffin corner" so far that they were lost from the onset with no recovery possible? Yes it is possible.

I am pretty certain that they will not find any more bodies for the reasons you have stated and I am not even convinced they will find much more in the way of large debris. Maybe something small here and there.

Man, that would be a scarey thought wouldn't it?? No more flight crews. Just computers making every decision and of course failing from time to time and a few mechancial/structural failures here and there, but hell- the airlines would save a mint even with all the lawsuits! Maybe service would improve though and the "food". I doubt it. Now they charge for a sammie that is far worse than you can buy at any 7/11. lmao