Bush can share the blame for financial crisis

by thomasjay Mon Feb 09, 2009 9:07 pm

The article is from September '08, but I think it's fairly objective

Bush can share the blame for financial crisis

WASHINGTON: For his entire presidency, George W. Bush has tried to avoid the fate of his father: brought low by a feeble economy. Now, as the financial crisis radiates far beyond Wall Street, Bush faces an even grimmer prospect: being blamed, at least in part, for an economic breakdown.

"There will be ample opportunity to debate the origins of this problem," Bush said Friday in a televised address from the White House Rose Garden. "Now is the time to solve it."

But in Washington and on Wall Street, the debate has already begun. And while economists and other experts say there are plenty of culprits: Democrats and Republicans in Congress, the Federal Reserve, an overzealous home-lending industry, banks, and also Bush's predecessor, Bill Clinton - they do agree that the Bush administration bears part of the blame.

These experts, from both political parties, say Bush's early personnel choices and overarching antipathy toward regulation created a climate that, if it did not trigger the turmoil, almost certainly aggravated it. The president's first two Treasury secretaries, for instance, lacked the kind of Wall Street expertise that might have helped them raise red flags about the use of complex financial instruments at the heart of the crisis.

To his credit, Bush accurately foresaw the danger posed by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and began calling as early as 2002 for greater regulation of the mortgage giants. But experts say the administration could have done even more to curb excesses in the housing market, and much more to police Wall Street, which transmitted those problems around the world.

In retrospect, "it would have helped for the Bush administration to empower the folks at Treasury and the Federal Reserve and the comptroller of the currency and the FDIC to look at these issues more closely," said Vince Reinhardt, a former Federal Reserve economist now at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative-leaning research organization here. Reinhardt said it would also have helped "for Congress to have held hearings."

Instead, voices inside the administration who favored tougher policing of Wall Street found themselves with few supporters. William Donaldson, a former Wall Street executive with respected Republican credentials who became chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission under Bush, quit in 2005 after facing resistance from the White House and Republican members of the panel, who criticized his support for stiffer regulations on mutual funds and hedge funds.

Today, even those sympathetic to Bush say he cannot disentangle himself from a home-lending industry run amok or a banking industry that mortgaged its future on toxic loans.

"The crisis definitely happened on their watch," said Kenneth Rogoff, a professor of economics at Harvard University who advises the Republican presidential candidate John McCain. "This is eight years into the Bush administration. There was a lot of time to deal with it."

To some extent, Bush was simply following a deregulatory pattern set by Clinton. Perhaps the most significant recent deregulation of the banking industry - the landmark act that allowed commercial banks to expand into other financial activities, like investment banking and insurance - was signed into law by Clinton in 1999.

Bush also inherited a culture of borrowing and a frothy housing market that has become "deeply embedded in the American psyche," Rogoff said. And Reinhardt said the markets seemed to be doing so well that few analysts, either in government or the private sector, had a critical eye.

"When everybody is doing better," Rogoff said, "it is difficult to see the underlying weaknesses."

Still, the White House, in the view of critics, fostered a free-market hothouse in which these excesses were able to flower. It avoided regulation of banks and mortgage brokers, leaving much of that work to the Federal Reserve, which, under Alan Greenspan, showed little appetite for regulation. By the time Bush's current Treasury secretary, Henry Paulson Jr., proposed an overhaul of regulations governing the financial sector in April, the storm was already brewing.

The administration did push hard on Capitol Hill to rein in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, only to find itself stymied by Congress. But the administration's intense focus on fending off what it foresaw as a looming housing crisis did not extend to the proliferation of fiendishly complex mortgage-backed securities, said Harvey Rosen, an economist who served on Bush's Council of Economic Advisers, briefly as its chairman.

"Maybe there should have been," Rosen said, "but we were focused more on the fact that if these entities just held plain-vanilla mortgage-backed securities, it was still a disaster in the making."

Beyond its deregulatory bent, some economists argue that the administration's fiscal and tax policies made the United States more dependent on foreign capital, which fueled the bubble in housing prices.

"A different Treasury would have taken a different approach," said Lawrence Summers, who served as Treasury secretary in the Clinton administration. "I don't think the economy has been well-managed, and that has certainly been crucial for the problems we're facing."

The White House and Congress wanted to make housing affordable to more Americans, and freeing up the lending markets was a way to do that. As Rogoff said, "It was a market-based way to help poor people. There was an incredible belief in free markets."

For all that faith, Bush's first two Treasury secretaries, Paul O'Neill and John Snow, came from top jobs in industry, not Wall Street. They were viewed in Washington as advocating the interests of business, and being less comfortable with the mysteries of the markets.

Neither was seen as having much influence with the White House, and the Treasury lost some of the primacy in economic policy it had enjoyed under Summers and his predecessor, Robert Rubin. O'Neill and Snow declined to be interviewed for this article.

"The primary agency responsible for keeping an eye on these things is, and should be, the Treasury Department, and I think the president erred in the first place by appointing two secretaries who had no background in finance," said Bruce Bartlett, a Republican economist who was an adviser to President Ronald Reagan and an official in the Treasury Department under President George H.W. Bush.

"If we had had a Treasury that was fully supported by the White House," Bartlett said, "and a Treasury secretary such as Hank Paulson who was really attuned to what was going on in the financial markets, maybe some of these things could have been perceived in advance."

The White House did name people well-versed in the markets to other posts, not least the chairmanship of the Securities and Exchange Commission. But Bush's first SEC chairman - Harvey Pitt, a prominent securities lawyer - was brought down by political missteps. Pitt was replaced by Donaldson, who quit in 2005.

Critics, including McCain, say the SEC has been less active under its current chairman, Christopher Cox, a former Republican congressman from California. It has spent less on enforcement and levied less in fines on wrongdoers, according to the Government Accountability Office.

"You can't overestimate what happens when you encourage regulators to believe that the goal of regulation is not to regulate," said Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at Columbia University.

In other areas, the Bush administration's failures seem more a case of inaction. The administration, economists said, did little to curb the practices of mortgage brokers, who are regulated by the states. But Democrats in Congress were equally to blame for this, these economists said.

"The Democrats pushed affordable housing goals, even in the face of evidence that people who got the loans shouldn't have gotten them," said Robert Litan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a research organization in Washington. "The no-money-down loans of 2005 and 2006 were a key part of the problem."

"I blame the Democrats for demanding that Fannie Mae keep buying these loans," said Litan, who was a budget official in the Clinton administration. "I blame the administration for going along with it."

White House officials note that the administration did propose reforms of real estate settlement procedures and the Federal Housing Authority, two areas it had identified as posing the greatest systemic risk to markets. Democrats in Congress, they said, blocked these efforts.

When Bush named Paulson to replace Snow in 2006, the Treasury Department finally got an expert in markets. But early on, his focus was on improving the competitiveness of the U.S. financial sector, which he feared was losing ground to Europe and Asia.

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/20/business/prexy.php?page=1

by **Grim17** Tue Feb 10, 2009 1:28 am

These experts, from both political parties, say Bush's early personnel choices and overarching antipathy toward regulation created a climate that, if it did not trigger the turmoil, almost certainly aggravated it. The president's first two Treasury secretaries, for instance, lacked the kind of Wall Street expertise that might have helped them raise red flags about the use of complex financial instruments at the heart of the crisis.

To his credit, Bush accurately foresaw the danger posed by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and began calling as early as 2002 for greater regulation of the mortgage giants. But experts say the administration could have done even more to curb excesses in the housing market, and much more to police Wall Street, which transmitted those problems around the world.

I think the first paragraph is pure speculation. It's easy to point out what could have been done differently after the fact, but where were these people back then? The fact is, the Bush administration did see the red flags flying, and warned congress that if they didn't take appropriate steps, it could lead to financial disaster. Even the Fed chairman Alan Greenspan, who testified in front of the banking committee of the looming danger, recommended that congress take necessary action.

What happened in congress is a matter of public record. The democrats claimed that there was no problem with Fanny and Freddy, no looming sub-prime crisis, no corruption or "cooking of the books", and that warnings from the Bush administration, congressional republicans, and the Fed chairman, were nothing more than partisan attacks on sound democratic policies. The democrats on the banking committee refused to see beyond partisanship, and by unanimous vote, killed a measure to apply stricter regulations and require more accountability from financial institutions such as Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac.

I will comment more when I have the time.